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OPINION OF THE COURT
  That clause states, “No person except a natural born1
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of
President . . . .”  U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
  In the “Issues Presented” section of Berg’s brief, issue2
nine is whether the District Court erred in “dismissing [Berg’s]
claims under Promissory Estoppel [by holding that] the DNC . . .
and Obama’s promise[s] to uphold the United States Constitution
are simply statements of principle and intent in the political realm
and are not enforceable promises[.]”  Appellant’s Br. at 3.  Berg
does not mention his promissory estoppel theory again, let alone
explain why the District Court’s holding was in error.  In any event,
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Philip Berg, a lawyer acting pro se, filed this action
challenging Barack Obama’s eligibility to run for and serve as
President of the United States.  The District Court dismissed
Berg’s action on the grounds that he lacks standing and failed to
state a cognizable claim.
I.
Before the 2008 presidential election, Berg sued then-
Presidential candidate Barack Obama, the Democratic National
Committee, and the Federal Election Commission, among
others, alleging that Obama was ineligible to run for and serve as
President because he was born in Kenya and therefore is not a
“natural born citizen” within the meaning of Article II, Section
1, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution.   Berg sought, in1
relevant part, a declaratory judgment that Obama was ineligible,
an injunction barring Obama from running for that office, and an
injunction barring the Democratic National Committee from
nominating him.
Although Berg brought a grab-bag of claims before the
District Court, he appeals only the dismissal of those brought
under the Natural Born Citizen Clause of the Constitution and 42
U.S.C. § 1983.   The District Court – assuming the factual2
the District Court was certainly correct that “[f]ederal courts . . . are
not and cannot be in the business of enforcing political rhetoric.”
App. at 35.
  On the day that we denied Berg’s motion, he petitioned3
the Supreme Court for certiorari and applied to Justice Souter, who
was at the time the Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit, for an
injunction to stay the November 2008 election.  The Supreme
Court denied the petition for certiorari and Justice Souter denied
the application for an injunction.
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allegations made by Berg to be true for the purposes of the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss those claims – dismissed the first
claim because “[t]he alleged harm to voters [like Berg]
stemming from a presidential candidate’s failure to satisfy the
eligibility requirement[s] of the Natural Born Citizen Clause is
not concrete or particularized enough to . . . satisfy Article III
standing,” App. at 15, and dismissed the § 1983 claim because
the “Natural Born Citizen Clause does not confer an individual
right on citizens or voters,” App. at 23.
Berg filed a notice of appeal and moved this court for an
“emergency” injunction to stay the presidential election of
November 4, 2008 pending resolution of that appeal.  We
declined to stay the election, noting that it appeared that Berg
lacked standing and thus failed to show a likelihood of success
on the merits.3
Obama won the election and Berg subsequently made
another “emergency” motion, asking this court to issue an order
prohibiting the certification of electors by the governors of each
state, to stay the members of the Electoral College from casting
their votes for Obama, and to stay the counting of electoral votes
in Congress.  We also denied that motion, reiterating Berg’s
apparent lack of standing and also stating that Berg’s lawsuit
seemed to present a non-justiciable political question.
The electoral votes have since been cast without objection
to Obama’s qualifications by any members of Congress, and
Obama was inaugurated.  Berg nonetheless persists in this
  See, e.g., Hollister v. Soetoro, 601 F. Supp. 2d 179, 1814
(D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing challenge to Obama’s eligibility);
Cohen v. Obama, No. 08-2150, 2008 WL 5191864, at *1 (D.D.C.
2008) (dismissing challenge to Obama’s eligibility), aff’d, 2009
WL 2870668 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (summary affirmance); Hollander
v. McCain, 566 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.N.H. 2008) (dismissing
challenge to Senator John McCain’s eligibility); Robinson v.
Bowen, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing
5
litigation.
II.
We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary.  Taliaferro v.
Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted).  Because the Defendants’ challenge to subject
matter jurisdiction was a “facial” one, we will accept the
allegations in the complaint as true.  Id.  It is Berg’s burden to
establish his standing.  FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of
Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1996).
We note that most of Berg’s arguments on appeal were
not made before the District Court and rest on facts that did not
exist when his complaint was filed, i.e., Obama’s election and
the casting of the electoral votes without objection.  Ordinarily,
we would not reach such arguments.  See United States v.
Anthony Dell’Aquilla, Enters. & Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 335
(3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, an issue
not raised in district court will not be heard on appeal.”) (citation
omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 n.4
(1992) (“The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends
on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.” (quoting
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830
(1989))).  In light of the public’s interest in the final resolution
of this case – which is one of a series of cases brought
challenging the qualifications of the 2008 presidential candidates
from both of the major political parties  – and the obvious lack4
challenge to McCain’s qualifications).  These cases have been
denominated by the press as “birther” cases.
  Although the defendants argue that this point is moot5
because the election is over, we consider the issue because “[t]his
controversy, like most election cases, fits squarely within the
‘capable of repetition yet evading review’ exception to the
mootness doctrine.”  Merle v. United States, 351 F.3d 92, 94 (3d
Cir. 2003).
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of any merit in Berg’s contentions, we will exercise our
discretion and address them to put some finality to the dispute.
In sum, we agree with the District Court that Berg lacks
standing to bring this suit because he has suffered no injury
particularized to him.  A prerequisite of standing is that the
litigant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact that is caused
by the complained-of conduct by a defendant and that can be
redressed by the court.  Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188.  An “injury
in fact” is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal
citations and quotations omitted).  “[W]hen the asserted harm is
a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure
by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does
not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (1975) (citation omitted).
We consider first the District Court’s holding that Berg’s
status as a voter did not provide him standing to challenge
Obama’s candidacy.   The District Court held that “a candidate’s5
ineligibility under the Natural Born Citizen Clause does not
result in an injury in fact to voters.”  App. at 19.  Berg specifies
no error in the District Court’s reasoning.  Instead, he merely
asserts, generally, that he was somehow harmed by each state
having “plac[ed] [Obama] on the ballot when there were
substantial questions concerning his citizenship status . . . .”
Appellant’s Br. at 17.
Berg’s worry that Obama, if elected, might someday be
7removed from office was not an injury cognizable in a federal
court because it was based on speculation and was contingent on
future events.  As a practical matter, Berg was not directly
injured because he could always support a candidate he believed
was eligible.  See Becker v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 230 F.3d
381, 390 (1st Cir. 2000) (no cognizable injury to voters when
they can still cast for preferred candidate), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
1007 (2001); Gottlieb v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 143 F.3d 618,
622 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (no harm to voters who could support the
candidate of their choice); Hollander, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 68; cf.
Gottlieb, 143 F.3d at 621 (injury to voters’ ability to influence
the political process too speculative for purposes of standing).
Berg’s wish that the Democratic primary voters had
chosen a different presidential candidate, and his dissatisfaction
that they apparently did not credit the evidence he tendered, do
not state a legal harm.  Similarly, Berg’s angst that the presence
on the ballot of an ineligible candidate might lessen the chances
that an eligible candidate might win was a non-cognizable
derivative harm.  See Crist v. Comm’n on Pres. Debates, 262
F.3d 193, 195 (2d Cir. 2001) (agreeing that “a voter fails to
present an injury-in-fact when the alleged harm . . . is only
derivative of a harm experienced by a candidate.”); Becker, 230
F.3d at 390; Gottlieb, 143 F.3d at 622.
Even if we assume that the placement of an ineligible
candidate on the presidential ballot harmed Berg, that injury,
including any frustration Berg felt because others refused to act
on his view of the law, was too general for the purposes of
Article III:  Berg shared both his “interest in proper application
of the Constitution and laws,” and the objective uncertainty of
Obama’s possible removal, pari passu with all voters; and the
relief he sought would have “no more directly and tangibly
benefit[ed] him than . . . the public at large.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at
573-74; see also Crist, 262 F.3d at 195; Becker, 230 F.3d at 389-
90; Gottlieb, 143 F.3d at 622; Hollander, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 68
(dismissing voter’s suit alleging that Senator McCain was
ineligible to be President under the Natural Born Citizen
Clause); Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(dismissing voter’s suit alleging that the Twelfth Amendment
8barred electors from voting for President George Walker Bush
and Vice President Cheney), aff’d, Jones v. Bush, 244 F.3d 134
(5th Cir. 2000) (summary affirmance), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1062 (2001); cf. Cohen, 2008 WL 5191864 at *1 (dismissing
citizen challenge to Obama’s eligibility); Robinson, 567 F. Supp.
2d at 1146-47 (dismissing elector’s suit challenging McCain’s
eligibility).
Now that the election is over, Berg’s stake in the
legitimacy of Obama’s presidency is shared by an even greater
number of people, i.e., all 300 million-plus U.S. citizens,
whether voters or not.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74; see Lance v.
Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 441-42 (2007) (Colorado voters lacked
standing to assert that a provision of the Colorado Constitution
violated the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution);
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
222 (1974) (citizens lacked standing to litigate under the
Incompatibility Clause the eligibility of members of Congress to
serve simultaneously in the military reserves); Ex parte Lévitt,
302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam) (private individual lacked
standing to invoke judicial power to determine validity of Justice
Black’s appointment to the Supreme Court).
The essence of Berg’s complaint is that the defendants,
the states, presidential candidates other than Obama, political
parties, a majority of American voters, and Congress – a list that
includes some who could have challenged, or could still
challenge, Obama’s eligibility through various means – have not
been persuaded by his claim.  That grievance, too, is not one
“appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”  Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
Berg also argues that he has standing “under the Tenth
Amendment because the power to determine the qualifications of
the President-elect is left to the states and the people after the
Congressmen and Senators failed to object to the counting of the
electoral votes” pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 15 – a statute that
provides a mechanism for members of Congress to object to
electoral votes after they are cast.  Appellant’s Br. at 18.  The
Tenth Amendment states:  “The powers not delegated to the
9United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
U.S. Const., amend. X.  That clause has no apparent relevance to
this case and Berg’s citation to Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452 (1991), is not helpful.
In Gregory, the Supreme Court upheld a state’s ability to
determine the qualifications for its state judiciary.  Id. at 455-56.
The plaintiffs were state court judges who alleged that the
section of the Missouri Constitution mandating that they retire at
the age of seventy violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 456.  The Gregory opinion does
not mention the word “standing,” and Berg’s citation to it is
inapposite.
Berg also cites to Robinson, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 1147, for
the proposition that he should be granted “automatic standing.”
Appellant’s Br. at 2.  The reference is baffling.  The district
court in Robinson held that an elector pledged to Alan Keyes
lacked standing to bring a suit challenging Senator McCain’s
qualifications under the Natural Born Citizen Clause.  Id. at
1146-47.  Berg cites to the following language of that opinion:
“Judicial review [of the claim]-if any-should occur only after the
electoral and Congressional processes have run their course.” 
Id. at 1147.  Berg incorrectly takes that to mean that he can bring
suit after members of Congress have declined to object pursuant
to 3 U.S.C. § 15.  It means no such thing.  The language is part
of an alternative holding made in anticipation of the “plaintiff’s
standing-cure suggestion that the American Independent Party 
. . . be allowed to intervene.”  Robinson, 567 F. Supp. 2d at
1147.  The Court held, in the alternative, that, even assuming
that the American Independent Party had standing, the claim was
unripe.  Id. (citing Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300-02
(1998)).
Berg maintains that he has suffered damage to his
reputation as a result of bringing this suit – he claims that he has
been accused of being a racist by unnamed others.  This “injury”
is not attributed to the Defendants.  Berg’s assertion that he has
  Berg’s arguments that the District Court ignored some of6
his voluminous motions and other pleadings not only suffer from
fatal defects in their reasoning, but are irrelevant.  If a District
Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss.
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been harmed because he has spent money on this lawsuit fails for
the same reason; the Defendants’ efforts to legally defend
themselves cannot cause injury that gives rise to Article III
standing or the doctrine would have no meaning.  Berg’s passing
reference that he was injured because he was denied some
“information concerning the qualifications of Obama” was made
in a vacuum, providing this court with no basis to analyze the
claim.
Berg asserts that the District Court erred in denying him
standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 because of a lack of state
action.  State action is not one of the three elements of standing.
See Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188.  In any event, the District Court
did not rely on a lack of state action to dismiss his case.  See
App. at 23-24 n.14.
Among the litany of Berg’s claims is his argument that he
was injured when the “President of the Senate failed to call for
objections during the counting of the electoral votes from each
state . . . .”  Appellant’s Br. at 28.  Berg supplies no factual basis
for that assertion and we have no idea if it is true, but, assuming
it is, Berg has been no more injured by that omission than any
other United States citizen.  Berg alternatively argues that he has
standing because his First Amendment rights were somehow
violated when his political representatives failed to object to the
electoral votes cast in Obama’s favor, as he wished them to. 
That argument is frivolous.  Berg’s final claim that the District
Court violated his due process rights by dismissing his case is
equally frivolous.
“Absent Article III standing, a federal court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiff’s claims, and
they must be dismissed.”   Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 188.6
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III.
Because there is no case or controversy, we will affirm
the District Court’s order dismissing Berg’s action.
